[Performance-based remuneration theoretically is an effective way of aligning the interests of company management with those of shareholders. However, 'earnings management' is a phenomenon that has been well documented by accounting researchers. Empirical studies suggest that corporate officers who are subject to performance-based remuneration may manage company accounting figures to improve their remuneration. This paper contends that such practices are inconsistent with the duties of loyalty to which these officers are subject, and concludes by identifying a corporate governance role for legal advisers in light of such conduct.]
Introduction
There has been an explosion in academic research on executive compensation. Major Australian companies, such as AMP, Commonwealth Bank and Western Mining Corporation, have recently suspended executive share option plans, at least partly in response to the perceived potential for options to provide management with perverse incentives (eg to engineer the company's accounting procedures so as artificially to improve the company's financial performance, and thus enhance the value of options or the likelihood of them being in-themoney at the vesting date). 4 understanding the theory behind earnings management, which is dealt with in Part III. Part IV discusses the practice of earnings management in an Australian context, with Part V then analysing this practice in the context of various general law and statutory duties. Finally, Part VI concludes by noting a possible corporate governance role for legal advisers in light of such conduct.
II The Role of Performance-Based Pay In Corporate Governance A Agency Theory
Listed companies are an economic force in capitalist societies, and these companies are traditionally characterised by the separation of ownership from management. 8 According to neo-classical economic theory, rational individuals will act to maximise their personal utility by acting in a way that is consistent with their perceived self interest. 9 This view of the world is not without its critics, 10 but has also been 15 See especially Godfrey, Hodgson and Holmes, above n Ошибка! Закладка не определена., 292, 295; Godfrey et al, above n Ошибка! Закладка не определена., 260-3; Christie, above n Ошибка! Закладка не определена., 25; Ng, above n Ошибка! Закладка не определена., ; and W Kinney Jr and D Martin, 'Does Auditing Reduce Bias In Financial Reporting? A Review of Audit-Related true that managers experience utility from the satisfaction that follows a job well done, 16 but managers' utility also increases from generously consuming executive perquisites and from exerting less rather than more effort at a fixed salary. These last two examples may be seen as manifestations of managerial self interest that, all other things being equal, reduce the actual or potential wealth of the company. 17 As long as managers own less than 100 percent of the company, they avoid the full cost of their 'shirking' but still benefit from such behaviour. 18 However, non-manager shareholders are worse off as their share of the company's actual or potential wealth diminishes without attendant benefit.
19

B Performance-Based Pay As a Potential Interest Aligning Mechanism
Themselves potentially rational self-interested utility maximisers, shareholders foresee that managers may act in a self-interested way that is inconsistent with the interests of shareholders.
20
Shareholders might therefore be expected to act to preserve their own interests. 21 For example, Simunic and Stein argue that managers who do not implement measures that appear to align their interests with those of shareholders could be paid less than what they would be paid if such measures were introduced. 22 Managers accordingly institute such 'bonding mechanisms' in order to preserve their own interests, 23 and one such mechanism is performance-based pay. 24 Performance-based pay in theory seeks to align the interests of managers and shareholders, by linking managerial utility to company performance. 25 ' (1985) 
III Earnings Management A The 'Bonus Plan' Hypothesis
The use of accounting numbers to determine company performance for the purposes of performance-based pay means that the amount of such pay may potentially be increased through 'management' of the accounting numbers so that the company's financial statements suggest good company performance.
42 All other things being equal, it could be expected that 'managing' the numbers would involve less effort than actually increasing the wealth of the company to bring about positive change to the financial statement figures.
43
Considering the reality of managerial self-interest, the notion that managers could be expected to 'manage' the numbers to increase their income should not be surprising. In fact, Healy has documented a statistically significant relationship in general between the presence of performance-based remuneration and the use of accounting treatments that for the most part increase the reported profit of the company. The accounting profit of a business may be 'managed' in various ways without changing the underlying 'reality' of that business. Provided that the requirements of Australian Accounting Standard AASB 108 are met, one way in which profit may be managed is to change from one acceptable accounting treatment to another. 52 With inflation (and with all other things being equal), inventory which is bought later in time will be more expensive than inventory that is bought earlier in time. If stock at the end of the financial year is valued on the basis that the inventory of the business is sold in the order in which it is acquired (ie 'first in, first out'), the (reported) cost to the business of the inventory that it has sold will be lower than if the cost of inventory sold were calculated as an average of the price paid for inventory at the beginning and at the end of the year. 53 This would bring about a relative increase in the profit of the business as reported in its financial statements. A change to the method under which the fixed assets of the business are depreciated which reduces the yearly depreciation expenses of the business will also bring about a relative increase in reported profit.
54
The accounting profit of a business may also be managed through the use and classification of discretionary items and accruals. 55 '. 57 Prior to the introduction of Australian Accounting Standard AASB 101, 'extraordinary' gains and losses were not taken into account in determining operating profit as such gains and losses were not regarded as arising from the ordinary operations of the business. 58 Managerial discretion does play a part in the decision on whether a particular item should be classified as 'extraordinary', for example in the delineation of the scope of the ordinary operations of the business.
59
By exercising their discretion in accounting matters, managers may therefore influence the level of their remuneration when they are subject to performance-based pay. The use of pre-existing accounting numbers and the disincentives to 'unravelling' or modifying these numbers for the purposes of bonus plans have previously been discussed. Pay for performance arrangements that are based in whole or in part on movements in the company's share price may still create an incentive for 'management' of the accounting numbers, as research has shown that reported accounting figures can have an impact on the price of a company's shares.
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W Guay, S Kothari and R Watts, 'A Market-Based Evaluation of Discretionary-Accrual Models ' (1996) 
IV AUSTRALIAN EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE A Australian Bonus Plans
A number of studies have investigated the incidence of bonus plans in Australia. Defina, Harris and Ramsay examined the relationship between pay and performance in 1990 using 89 of the 136 largest Australian companies and found no correlation between pay and performance levels. 61 Izan, Sidhu and Taylor studied a sample of 99 firms from 1987 to 1992 and found no evidence of a relationship between chief executive officer pay and firm performance. 62 However, Matolcsy points out that the prevalence of performance-based pay is not stable over time but is instead dependent on the economic cycle, noting that there is no observable relationship between pay and performance during periods of economic downturn but that there is a positive relationship between pay and performance during periods of economic growth.
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Accounting Review 723; Peter Easton, 'Accounting Earnings and Security Valuation: Empirical Evidence of the Fundamental Links ' (1985) Although the precise make up of bonus plans may vary between companies across industry sectors and from firm to firm, Deegan has noted that accounting numbers do play a part in determining company performance for the purposes of performance-based pay.
68
B Bonus Plan Hypothesis Behaviour In Australia
Australian evidence is consistent with the bonus plan hypothesis developed by Healy, 69 namely that managers may be expected to in general adopt accounting treatments that for the most part increase the reported profit of the company when they are subject to performance-based remuneration. Godfrey and Adi and Godfrey and Jones have documented that managerial remuneration does have an impact on the accounting choices adopted by a company, and in particular on decisions in relation to discretionary accruals. 70 Walsh, Craig and Clarke point out that extraordinary items appearing in the profit and loss statements of Australian companies have been predominantly negative in nature, meaning that there has been a tendency to classify losses as extraordinary. 71 Conversely, Hoffman and Zimmer reveal that companies with highly remunerated chief executive officers ('CEOs') have been more likely to classify gains as operating, rather than extraordinary. As previously discussed, the Standards allow considerable discretion by enabling apparently similar business facts to be portrayed in different ways for accounting purposes. 90 This flexibility in theory exists in order to accommodate the diverse environments in which businesses operate. 91 It has been noted that managers accordingly are required to use their 'professional skill and specialised knowledge' when choosing between available accounting treatments, so as to choose the treatment that most appropriately reflects the circumstances of the company.
92
Boards of directors therefore for the most part effectively give senior company managers like CEOs the ability to select between different accounting treatments under the Accounting Standards for the purposes of satisfying the company's reporting obligations. 93 As noted above, 94 the accounting performance of the company as reported in its financial statements can be expected to be taken into account in the pay for performance arrangements under which these managers may be remunerated. The board's potential liability for possible misconduct by managers in the exercise of this delegated power is discussed in the text accompanying nn 154-164, below. 94 In the text accompanying nn 27-41. 95 Executive directors may also be subject to performance-based pay. discussed that the preparers of financial statements who are subject to pay for performance arrangements that draw on the accounting performance of the company as reported in its financial statements can often be said to have prepared these financial statements in ways that might generally be expected to maximise the remuneration of the preparers under these arrangements, in large part by choosing accounting treatments that would increase the reported profit of the company over treatments which would have the opposite effect.
96 This conduct will now be discussed in the context of the duty to act bona fide in the best interests of the company, the duty to act for proper purposes and the prohibition against making an improper use of position.
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B Acting Bona Fide In the Best Interests of the Company
It is well established that the directors of a company must act bona fide in the best interests of the company.
98 While this does not mean that a court will closely scrutinise the merits of board decisions, 99 it
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Although this paper focuses on senior managers as they are often the ones responsible for preparation of the financial statements, the principles discussed are equally applicable to executive directors who are subject to performance-based pay and who engage in 'earnings management'. 'relevant' and 'irrelevant' considerations from public law. 108 As discussed above, the flexibility that the choice of different accounting treatments provides exists in order to accommodate the diverse environments in which businesses operate. When managers choose between available accounting treatments not so as to most appropriately reflect the circumstances of the company but instead to maximise the reported profit of the company so as to maximise their performance-based remuneration and thereby gain a personal financial benefit, there is an issue as to whether they are ignoring relevant considerations and instead having regard to improper considerations. 109 Secondly, it can also be said that conduct of this kind is not in the best interests of the company. Increasing reported profits through accounting choices with the aim of maximising performance-based remuneration has negative implications for shareholder wealth.
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When managers choose between available accounting treatments not so as to most appropriately reflect the circumstances of the company but instead to maximise the reported profit of the company so as to maximise their performancebased remuneration, they may end up receiving by way of remuneration more than what they would otherwise have received had they not made such choices.
111 The company's enhanced performance (albeit potentially consistent with the Accounting Standards) exists only on paper, whereas real wealth flows out of the company to managers in the form of managerial compensation. 112 This would appear to be 32-4; and Worthington, 'Directors' Duties'. 108 See especially Sealy, '"Bona Fides" and "Proper Purposes"', above n 100, 268, 277; and Worthington, 'Directors' Duties', above n 80, 122-3. On how to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant considerations see, eg, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24; R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 45; and R v Toohey (Aboriginal Land Commissioner) All other things being equal, it would therefore be hard to see how an intelligent, honest CEO could genuinely consider the accounting choice in question to be in the best interests of the company.
114 It is at least arguable that no fiduciary acting reasonably could consider this to be the case, 115 as fiduciary relationships exist to align the interests of fiduciaries with those of the beneficiaries of the fiduciary relationship. 116 In particular and as discussed above, pay for performance arrangements are aimed at aligning the interests of company management with those of the company (practically, the company's members).
117 As previously noted, 118 when managers choose between available accounting treatments not so as to most appropriately reflect the circumstances of the company but in order to maximise the reported profit of the company so as to maximise their performance-based remuneration, they are furthering Method Choice: Opportunistic Behaviour, Efficient Contracting and Information Perspectives ' (1990) their own interests at the expense of the company. 119 It would not appear to be relevant that the pay for performance arrangements themselves might not expressly prohibit choosing between available accounting treatments not so as to most appropriately reflect the circumstances of the company but so as to maximise the reported profit of the company in order to maximise the performance-based remuneration in question. 120 Chief Justice Cardozo has observed that a laissez-faire, free-market philosophy only has a limited role to play in fiduciary relationships, 121 as the obligations imposed under such relationships in general exist in order to curb the potential for selfinterested exploitation of contractual opportunities by the fiduciary. 122 In particular, Duggan suggests that fiduciary obligations represent 'default contracts', in that if equity did not impose such obligations, the parties to the relationship would expressly agree to them in any event. 123 It might be said that this argument gains support from the view that fiduciary obligations safeguard the integrity of socially beneficial relationships in cases where there may be a divergence in the interests of the parties to the relationship. 124 As noted above, listed companies are an economic force in capitalist societies and such companies are traditionally characterised by the separation of ownership and management.
C Proper Purposes
It is well established that corporate powers must be exercised for proper purposes. 125 This principle has predominantly been considered in the context of hostile takeovers 126 but is one of general application. 127 Further, while the principle has mostly been applied to directors, 128 they are not the only ones who are bound by this rule. 129 As Corkery and
Worthington point out, the principle is applicable to all donees who exercise limited powers. 130 As previously noted, 131 the power of a company's board to prepare financial statements can be said to arise from statutory disclosure provisions, the board's general management power over the company and the duties of care, skill and diligence imposed on directors. The common delegation of this power to senior management in practice has also been discussed.
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Disputes in relation to proper and improper purposes have predominantly arisen in the context of the issuing of shares, 133 and the purposes for which the power to prepare financial statements may or may not be exercised do not appear to have been judicially considered. 134 It has been said that the nature and sources of a power will determine the purposes for which the power may or may not be used. 135 As has been observed, the considerable discretion that is available in the exercise of the power to prepare financial statements is present in order to accommodate the diverse environments in which businesses operate, which requires managers to use their 'professional skill and specialised knowledge' when choosing between available accounting treatments so as to most appropriately reflect the circumstances of the company. 136 It is therefore arguable that choosing accounting treatments with the aim of maximising performancebased remuneration represents an exercise of the power to select between different accounting treatments for an improper purpose. As Lord Wilberforce has observed, self-interest is 'the commonest instance of improper motive'.
137 When managers choose between available accounting treatments in order to maximise the reported profit of the company so as to maximise their performancebased remuneration, accounting choices ostensibly are not being made so as to best reflect the performance of the company. 138 The fiduciary position occupied by senior managers who in practice are largely charged with the preparation of the financial statements has been noted above, 139 and arguably reinforces the view that the power to select between different accounting treatments must be exercised for the benefit of the company and not for managerial self gain.
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D Improper Use of Position
Section 182 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) proscribes the making of improper use of a corporate position. 141 When managers choose between available accounting treatments not so as to most appropriately reflect the circumstances of the company but instead to maximise the reported profit of the company so as to maximise their performance-based remuneration, it can be argued that they are in contravention of the prohibition in s 182. 142 As previously discussed, such conduct arguably involves a breach of the equitable duties to act bona fide in the best interests of the company and for proper purposes. 143 The cases suggest that such wrongs would constitute impropriety for the purposes of s 182, 144 and the terms of the section apply the prohibition against improper use of position to everyone from the directors of the corporation to its employees. It is arguable that dishonesty potentially is present when the preparers of financial statements knowingly make accounting choices in the preparation of these statements with the intention of maximising their performance-based remuneration. 147 As noted above, when managers choose between available accounting treatments not so as to most appropriately reflect the circumstances of the company but instead to maximise the reported profit of the company so as to maximise their performance-based remuneration, they may end up receiving by way of remuneration more than what they would otherwise have received had they not made such choices. 148 The company's enhanced performance (albeit potentially consistent with the Accounting Standards) exists only on paper, whereas real wealth flows out of the company to managers in the form of managerial compensation. 149 Deliberately making accounting choices with the intention of bringing this scenario about arguably would suggest that there has been a breach of s 184(2).
150
Under s 184(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), an officer of a corporation also commits a criminal offence if he or she is intentionally dishonest and fails to exercise his or her powers, or to discharge his or her duties:
• in good faith in the best interests of the corporation; or • for a proper purpose.
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As previously discussed, when managers choose between available accounting treatments not so as to most appropriately reflect the circumstances of the company but instead to maximise the reported profit of the company so as to maximise their performancebased remuneration, it can be argued that they are potentially in breach of their duties to act bona fide in the best interests of the company and for proper purposes. 152 When managers deliberately increase the paper wealth of the company with the intention of increasing the real wealth that flows out of the company to them in the form of managerial compensation, such conduct may potentially be regarded as dishonest and therefore arguably also a breach of s 184(1). 153 may also be measured in terms of upward movement in the company's share price, but research has shown that a company's reported accounting profit can have an impact on the price of the company's shares. See n 60 above, and accompanying text. 149 See, eg, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, above 155 and under the duty to exercise care, skill and diligence, 156 for the potentially wrongful conduct by managers as discussed above and as predicted by the bonus plan hypothesis. 157 The many studies which appear to confirm the incidence of the behaviour predicted by the bonus plan hypothesis 158 might mean that boards may lack reasonable grounds to believe that managers who are charged with preparing the company's financial statements will make the accounting choices that are available in the preparation of these statements bona fide in the best interests of the company and for proper purposes, 159 where these managers are subject to pay for performance arrangements under which their remuneration might be determined at least in part by the performance of the company as reported in its financial statements.
The above could therefore be one example of a situation where boards might have to monitor management with a great degree of care and diligence. 160 However, the same potential lack of detailed familiarity by the board with the day to day operations of the business which can make the delegation of the financial statement preparation function to management efficient 161 could also mean that boards and non-executive directors might find it difficult to effectively question senior management or executive directors on the dominant reasons for the choice of certain accounting treatments over others. 162 It could be the case that exercising due care and diligence under these circumstances might require the board to refrain from delegating to management the responsibility for preparation of the company's financial statements. 163 However, as Rehnert points out, a board dominated by executive directors who are subject to performance-based pay under which remuneration is determined at least in part by the performance of the company as reported in its financial statements could still end up making accounting choices that ultimately are primarily aimed at increasing the remuneration of these directors.
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F Problems Practical and Legal
It would appear that the very nature of the breaches of the legal and equitable duties potentially arising from the practice of 'earnings management' as discussed above (eg an apparent failure to act bona fide in the best interests of the company or for proper purposes) 165 would likely preclude the application of a defence that is based on the 'business judgment rule'. 166 However, as will be discussed below, litigating the potential breaches of duty that might be associated with 'earnings management' could prove to be difficult in practice. 167 
Proving Actual Bad Faith
It is one thing to infer from the results of relevant academic studies 168 that managers who are subject to pay for performance arrangements under which their remuneration is potentially influenced by the accounting profit of the company as reported in its financial statements 169 may, in the preparation of these statements, choose between available accounting treatments not so as to most appropriately reflect the circumstances of the company but instead to maximise the reported profit of the company so as to maximise their performance-based remuneration. 170 It is another thing to actually prove that this has taken place in individual cases.
171
The Accounting Standards allow for the exercise of a significant amount of discretion in the preparation of the financial statements.
172 Even if managers are subject to pay for performance arrangements under which their remuneration may be influenced by the accounting profit of the company as reported in its financial statements, 173 and the accounting treatments employed in the preparation of these statements in general are those that would increase the reported profit of the company rather than those which would have the opposite effect, it still does not necessarily follow (whether on the balance of probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt) 174 
'Mixed Purposes'
The problem of 'mixed purposes' presents itself if the proper purposes doctrine is invoked in the context of 'earnings management', as it would appear to be unlikely that a manager would choose one accounting treatment over another solely for the purpose of potentially increasing his or her remuneration under a pay for performance arrangement. 177 As noted above, listed companies are legally required by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to prepare financial statements. 178 Compliance with this obligation requires the making of choices between different accounting treatments, as the Accounting Standards allow for the exercise of a significant amount of discretion in the preparation of the financial statements. 179 The phenomena of 'earnings management' could therefore be said to reflect the combination of the need to choose accounting treatments in the first place, and the actual selection of treatments that in general have the relative effect of increasing the accounting profit of the company as reported in its financial statements.
It might therefore be said that conduct amounting to 'earnings management' may potentially be motivated by mixed 'compliance' and 'remuneration increasing' purposes. 180 If this is the case, it would appear that the conduct in question would fall foul of the proper purposes doctrine only if the desire to potentially increase the amount of performance-based remuneration was the 'substantial reason' 181 for choosing some accounting treatments over others, or this desire was a significant reason 'but for' which 182 the relevant accounting treatments would not have been chosen. It could prove to be very hard to establish the existence of either of the above in individual cases. As previously noted, the Accounting Standards allow the preparers of financial statements to exercise a significant amount of discretion in the process of preparing these statements. The significant amount of discretion allowed for by the Standards in the exercise of preparing the statements could mean that the treatments ultimately chosen for the purposes of preparing the statements might generally be those that have the relative effect of increasing the accounting profit of the company, even absent 'substantial' or 'significant' bad faith on the part of the statement preparers. 183 Again, too much could depend on the credibility of the individuals in question.
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The Loss or Profit From Earnings Management May Be Difficult To Prove
It could be said that managers who deliberately increase the paper wealth of the company with the intention of increasing the real wealth that flows out of the company to them in the form of managerial compensation are furthering their own interests at the expense of the company. However, quantifying the amount of this gain which has occurred at the company's expense would appear to rest on the answer to the following question: if managerial selfinterest had not coloured the selection of the relevant accounting treatments, what treatments might have been chosen? 185 Unfortunately, the answer to this question does not appear to readily present itself, because the same accounting choices could still have been made. As previously noted, the accounting treatments chosen for the purposes of preparing the company's financial statements might generally be those that have the relative effect of increasing the accounting profit of the company, even absent a desire on the part of the preparers of these statements to potentially increase their performance-based pay in instances where they are subject to pay for performance arrangements under which their remuneration is influenced by the accounting profit of the company as reported in its financial statements. The Accounting Standards give the preparers of financial statements a not insignificant degree of discretion in the choice of the accounting treatments used in the preparation of these statements. 186 It could therefore be said that choosing treatments that have the relative effect of increasing the reported profit of the company of itself would not appear to be improper, unless this choice was motivated by reasons other than the desire to most appropriately reflect the circumstances of the company (eg the desire to increase the amount of remuneration influenced by the performance of the company). 187 As discussed above, establishing the presence of the latter intention as one of the reasons for the accounting choices made could prove to be difficult in practice as it appears that, absent direct evidence of managerial bad faith, too much would depend on the credibility of the individuals in question.
The loss to the company and the gain to the manager from 'earnings management' can be said to be the increase in the amount of the remuneration paid to the manager as a result of the accounting treatments that were chosen out of self interest, compared to the amount of remuneration that would have been paid if self interest had not motivated the selection of these treatments. 189 As previously noted, the significant amount of discretion allowed for by the Accounting Standards in the exercise of preparing the financial statements could mean that the treatments ultimately chosen for the purposes of preparing the statements might generally be those that have the relative effect of increasing the accounting profit of the company (and accordingly the amount of the remuneration that is influenced by the company's accounting performance), even absent 'substantial' or 'significant' bad faith on the part of the statement preparers. The significant discretion given by the Standards to the preparers of the financial statements in terms of the accounting treatments that may be utilised in the preparation of such statements might also carry with it the result that the 'objective circumstances' surrounding the exercise of the discretion (eg the presence of pay for performance arrangements under which remuneration is influenced by the performance of the company as reported in its financial statements, and the actual selection of treatments that in general have the relative effect of increasing the reported profit of the company) could conceivably be said to be of less evidentiary assistance here when compared to disputes over bona fides and proper purposes that occur in other contexts. 190 the practice of earnings management as noted above could by definition unfortunately indicate that nonlitigious methods of policing earnings management might not always potentially be effective or efficient.
201 If all else is going well in the company, it could very well be that earnings management that is driven by performance-based pay might simply be acknowledged begrudgingly as a potential 'agency cost' of corporate life.
202
VI Conclusion: A Note On a Potential Corporate Governance Role For Legal Advisers
This paper has sought to query what appears to be an assumption to the effect that the practice of 'earnings management', while potentially morally questionable, is not legally problematic. Beginning with an economic analysis of performance-based pay and earnings management that for the most part appears to have been absent from the legal pay for performance literature to date, it has attempted to demonstrate that earnings management that is motivated by the presence of a pay for performance arrangement would appear to contravene the equitable and statutory duties to which the preparers of financial statements are subject. Difficulties of proof and disincentives to litigation affect not the conclusion that company managers who exercise their accounting discretions with the aim of maximising their performance-based remuneration could arguably be said to be misusing their position and contravening their duties to act bona fide in the best interests of the company and for proper purposes.
It is in this respect that legal advisers may have a 204 Ingleby and Johnstone point out that lawyers perform a 'gatekeeper' function in relation to the legal system, 205 and Yablon has alluded to the potential influence that legal advice may have in terms of shaping the making of corporate decisions. 206 As the suggestion is that earnings management that is motivated by the presence of a pay for performance arrangement would appear to contravene the equitable and statutory duties to which the preparers of financial statements are subject, it may be that far-sighted lawyers who truly are acting in the best interests of their clients would conduct themselves so as to alert those concerned to this possibility in as tactful and diplomatic a manner as possible, especially in light of the research that appears to suggest that company managers might be expected to exercise their accounting discretions with the aim of maximising their performance-based remuneration. As noted above, difficulties of proof and disincentives to litigation affect not the conclusion that such conduct would amount to a misuse of position and a contravention of the duties to act bona fide in the best interests of the company and for proper purposes.
